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The Historical Turn in the Constitutional Law

of Foreign Relations
G. Edward White*

T

his essay analyzes the historical turn in the constitutional law of foreign
relations. As background, I begin with some assertions about the historical turn
in constitutional law scholarship generally. These introductory comments deserve
more extensive discussion and support, but are being telescoped for reasons of space.
Contemporary constitutional law scholarship has undergone a decisive historical
turn, resulting in the subject matter and methodologies of history occupying a more
prominent place in the legal academy than they have held since the 1920s. An
important reason for this turn is the peculiar fragility of constitutional law
scholarship, which has manifested itself in the extremely limited shelf-life of
monographs in the field.' The fragility of constitutional law scholarship has been a
function of its orientation toward "resolving" contemporary issues in constitutional
law. At bottom, the average constitutional law monograph consists of a series of
theoretical justifications for deciding given cases in a given fashion; when those cases,
and their issues, cease to be of central focus, the case-dependency of the theory
becomes revealed. From this perspective, the historical turn in constitutional
scholarship can be seen as an effort in extending the time frame, and scope, of
constitutional inquiry, and in so doing extending the shelf-life of scholarly work.
The rise of historical inquiry in constitutional scholarship has unavoidably been
accompanied by the infiltration of historical methodologies. Here two problems
immediately surface. One involves the relationship of historical inquiry to the
purposive character of legal scholarship. To be influential, legal scholarship must have
a "payoff"-contemporary normative implications that resonate. Traditional canons
of historical writing de-emphasize such pragmatic concerns, maintaining that
purposive historical inquiry results in a "presentist" bias that distorts the meaning of
sources. One difficulty, therefore, is how to restrain purposivism in historically
grounded constitutional scholarship. A second difficulty is how to sustain a "payoff"
for such work if purposivism is constrained-how to prevent historical inquiry from
being simply an antiquarian exercise.
Elsewhere I have outlined a methodological approach to these sets of problems,
one which concedes the contemporary dimensions of any historical inquiry but seeks
* University Professor andJohn B. Minor Professor of Law and History, University of Virginia.
1. Compare the relatively extensive shelf-life ofi John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust A Theory of
Judicial Review (Harvard 1980), with that of the numerous other monographs in constitutional
work is now generally
theory which appeared at the same time but are no longer timely. Even Ely's
treated as having been centered on a problem-the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"-which some
current scholarship seeks to "dissolve" or "get beyond."
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to constrain purposivism through a posture of "detachment" that requires the
historian to avoid rushing toward contemporary payoffs in evaluating the actions of
historical actors with necessarily different sensibilities.2 I will not elaborate upon this
approach here, except to say that an especially important "payoff' of historical inquiry,
one that has direct implications for constitutional law scholarship, is the subversive
effect on contemporary conventional wisdom of forays into the starting assumptions
of past generations. Often a recreation of those assumptions reveals an intellectual
universe quite foreign to our own, and has the effect of reminding us that other
educated and sensible people, living at a different point in time, operated within a
radically different epistemological framework. This can teach us about the
contingency of our own belief structures, and contribute to efforts to detach ourselves
from conventional legal wisdom or to revise intellectual precepts we take for granted.
My focus in this essay is on one set of conventional wisdom, animated by one set
of starting precepts, in the area of constitutional foreign relations law. The set of
starting precepts assumes a separation of the constitutional law of foreign relations
from domestic constitutional law. And the conventional wisdom is that this
separation has always existed in American constitutional jurisprudence. The topic
provides us with a notorious example of purposive historical inquiry, of historical
analysis overwhelmed by contemporary payoffs. It also provides a locus for the sort of
historical inquiry which might yield the quite different payoffs of detachment from
conventional wisdom: revisionist, historically grounded scholarship with possibly
greater scholarly shelf-life.
I
The period between 1920 and the close of the Second World War witnessed a
transformation in constitutional foreign relations jurisprudence! Three features of
this transformation are salient for present purposes. First, there was a sharp
separation of the internal and external affairs of the United States. Second, there was
a claim that the foreign affairs powers of the federal government rested to an
important extent on the government's status as an international sovereign, and were
thus "extra-constitutional" in origin and not limited by traditional constitutional
doctrines like separation of powers and federalism. Third, there was a related claim
that the appropriate constitutional model of foreign affairs policymaking should be
one centered on the discretionary powers of the national executive, including the
power of executive suggestion to federal courts and the power to make executive
agreements that trump state law.
This transformation was also characterized by the purposive interpretation of
historical sources by the Court and legal commentators. Judges and scholars claimed
2.

See G. Edward White, Intervention and Detachment: Essays in Legal History andJurisprudence(Oxford

1994).
3. For the details of the transformation, see G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional
Regime ofForeignRelations, 85 Va L Rev 1 (1999).
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that the federal government possessed "inherent" foreign affairs powers since the
Articles of Confederation; that the Constitution's allocation of power to the federal
government assumed no involvement by the states in foreign affairs; that the federal
government possessed plenary and exclusive "extra-constitutional" foreign relations
powers; and that the federal executive had far more discretionary power in the realm
of foreign relations than it did in the domestic realm, both with respect to potential
competing powers in Congress or the Senate and with respect to competing powers in
the states.4 There was almost no historical basis for these claims.'
The posited separation of constitutional foreign relations issues from domestic
issues nonetheless became accepted conventional wisdom after the Second World
War, with some notable effects in the scholarly community. One was the general
withdrawal of late twentieth-century constitutional scholars from the field of
constitutional foreign relations, leaving the discipline primarily to scholars whose
principal interests have been in international law.6 Another was the creation of what I
have called "a myth of continuity" in constitutional foreign relations jurisprudence.
That myth, primarily the product of work originating in the 1970s, takes the sharp
separation of domestic from foreign relations constitutional jurisprudence as a given,
relates it to the Constitution's assignment of diplomatic and ambassadorial powers to
the Executive, and proceeds as if plenary and exclusive federal power to conduct
foreign affairs has always been the norm. Whereas as late as 1922 Quincy Wright
published a treatise, The Control of American Foreign Relations, that was largely faithful
to the historical development of constitutional foreign relations law and emphasized
the intimate connections between the international and domestic dimensions of
American foreign policymaking, recent works on constitutional foreign relations
jurisprudence have been notable for their relatively attenuated, simplistic history and
for their indiscriminate acceptance of a bright-line separation between the domestic
and foreign relations realms of American constitutional law.
It is not hard to see why these developments occurred. A theory of the
constitutional limits on the foreign relations powers of the federal government that
treats those limits as comparable to the limits on the United States' exercise of
domestic powers is extremely inconvenient in an international arena in which
flexibility, swiftness, and decisiveness are thought to be necessary for foreign
policymakers. In this context, traditional constitutional jurisprudence, which largely
equates foreign policymaking with federal treaties and assumes the existence of
separation of powers and federalism checks on foreign relations lawmaking, becomes
4.

The key decisions were: United States v Curtiss-WrigbtExport Corp, 299 US 304 (1936); United States v

Belmont, 301 US 324 (1937); and United States v Pink, 315 US 203 (1942).
S. For a historical criticism of these claims, see White, 85 Va L Rev at 106-08 (cited in note 3).
6. Since the 1950s, scholarship on constitutional foreign relations issues has primarily been engaged in
by legal scholars whose primary interest is international law, or by historians. The two most
noteworthy examples are the legal scholar Louis Henkin and the historian Charles Lofgren. The
coverage of foreign relations issues in most constitutional law casebooks, for the same time period,
has been extremely attenuated.
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awkward.
Since the close of World War II, the tendency to separate the foreign affairs and
domestic realms of constitutional jurisprudence has only increased among both courts
and commentators. Beginning in the 1940s, the decision-making powers of the federal
executive became the basis of a developing federal common law of foreign relations in
federal courts. Initially, this law was predicated on explicit executive "suggestions"
about the treatment of foreign nationals or sovereigns in those courts.7 Some
commentators considered these suggestions controversial, for they represented an
abdication of judicial power.8 By applying federal common law, judges avoided the
potential difficulty posed by Erie 9-that the law declared in the federal courts was to
track that of the states in which they sat." By the 1960s, however, the federal courts
began to make independent determinations of the "foreign relations" character of
issues, and declare them to be uniquely the province of the federal government, even
where the executive branch had expressed no position on their resolution. 0 By the
1990s, federal courts routinely declared that the resolution of private law cases had
"foreign affairs effects," and thus were governed by a judge-made federal common law
of foreign relations that preempted competing state law.1' Appeals to history justified
these developments, but in fact, like the original transformation, they lacked any
historical basis.
The most significant recent illustration of the severance of constitutional foreign
relations law from constitutional domestic law has been the tendency of some federal
courts,12 and several scholars," to look to unratified or non-self-executing treaties or
the resolutions of international organizations, such as the United Nations General
Assembly, as sources of federal customary international law that preempt state law in
the federal courts. The most common examples of such pronouncements are in the
human rights area. Scholars claim that the declarations of international bodies on
torture, capital punishment and hate speech should be included in the body of
customary international law to be applied as federal law by federal courts in cases
7. See The Navemar, 303 US 68 (1938); William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:
A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VandJ Transnatl L 257 (1998).
8. See, for example, Philip Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions, 40 Am J Intl L
168 (1946); Note, JudicialDeference to the State Department on InternationalLegal Issues, 97 U Pa L Rev
79(1948).
9. Erie RR Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938).
lo. The leading cases are Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964) and Zscbering v Miller,

389 US 429 (1968).
ii. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va L Rev 1617 (1997); Jack
L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States ForeignRelations Law, 70 U Colo L Rev 1395, 1407-

08 (1999).
12.

The most prominent case is Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980) (holding that
Paraguayan citizens could sue a Paraguayan official in federal court for acts, committed in Paraguay,
that violated human rights principles as declared by international bodies).
13. A conspicuous example is Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, 111 Harv L
Rev 1824 (1998). See also Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 Const Commen 33

(1997).
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having "foreign relations effects." 14
This development has extended the constitutional transformation that took place
between the world wars, and perhaps constitutes a separate transformation in itself.
Early twentieth-century American constitutional jurisprudence recognized that
foreign relations were "different," requiring a more extensive exercise of discretionary
federal power, trumping state power where conflicts existed. Even after Erie's mandate
requiring the federal courts to follow the common law of the states in which they sat,
foreign relations cases remained "different," as witnessed by the instances in which the
Executive stated that the interests of the United States required the particular
resolution of any case involving a foreign sovereign or foreign national to be in a
federal court. Building on the assumption that in such instances the executive

suggestion trumped competing state law, federal courts took it upon themselves to
determine when a case had "foreign affairs effects" and thus stood in a "different"
realm. In such instances, a version of court-declared federal law, customary
international law as understood by the federal courts, trumped state law. Now, the
argument goes, since the declarations made in multilateral treaties or international
organizations are regarded as customary international law, they should properly
become part of the federal law to be applied in cases with "foreign affairs effects" in the
federal courts."
Like related earlier developments, scholarly appeals to purposive history marked
the judicial incorporation of customary international law into federal law.
Commentators have equated the "general common law" that federal courts declared
prior to Erie, which did include strands of customary international law, with a postErie "federal law" based on superficially comparable sources." But there is no historical
basis for merging those two types of law. Pre-Erie general common law was not
conceived of as federal law, although it was handed down by federal courts. It was a
product of the understood power of the judiciary to ascertain, declare, and apply
sources of law, wherever those sources might appear. A critique of that jurisprudential
proposition predicated the Erie decision. It suggested that such "law," when applied to
disputes involving citizens of states, was illusory, being simply the product of judicial
inclinations. After Erie, the only non-state law federal courts could declare was
positively enacted federal law, the product of the Constitution, federal laws, or selfexecuting treaties. Such law preempted competing state law by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause, but only where an actual conflict existed.
Customary international law norms derived from international pronouncements
14. See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporationof InternationalLaw,
111 Harv L Rev 2260, 2264 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law:A Critiqueof the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (1997).
that since the 1980s, the President and the Senate have consistently, as a
15. This despite the fact
condition of ratifying multilateral human rights treaties, attached "reservations, understandings, and
declarations" that ensure the treaties shall have no domestic effect.
16. See, fcr example, Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 Mich L Rev 1555
(1984); see also Koh, 111 Harv L Rev at 1831-33 (cited in note 13).
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and from unratified or non-self-executing treaties can hardly be described as positive
federal law in the Erie sense. Thus, for such norms to be considered to have legal
effect, particularly when they collide with state law, it is necessary for scholars to claim
that the foreign affairs powers of the federal government are in an important sense not
limited by the same set of constitutional constraints as federal domestic powers. 7 This
was, of course, one of the arguments propounded by original proponents of the
separation between domestic and foreign affairs in constitutional law. But, if anything,
Eriejurisprudence has made that argument even less plausible. If federal courts cannot
declare "general" law from a variety of sources because they have no authority to do so,
they should not be able to declare that international human rights norms which the
federal political branches have not absorbed into domestic law are nonetheless
"federal" law.
Even if we assume that the foreign relations powers of the federal government are
"different" from those of its domestic powers-different because of the historical
sources of the federal foreign relations power and the exigencies of international
policymaking-it would seem to be because of the Constitution's expectation that the
Executive (subject to Senate consent) would be the principal organ of foreign
policymaking, and because (if one accepts one version of history) every international
sovereign has some inherent power to conduct foreign relations. Neither of these
grounds justify foreign relations lawmaking by the federal courts, especially in the
absence of Executive suggestions and in light of the constitutional concerns raised by
Erie about the legitimacy of federal judge-declared law not grounded in any positive
edict of the federal government.
The disengagement of constitutional foreign relations jurisprudence from its
domestic counterpart has been, from its inception, driven by particularistic responses
to the perceived exigencies of international policymaking. The disengagement never
rested on any historical or theoretical basis that survives even mild scrutiny. Rather, it
rested on a series of intuitions-that foreign and domestic affairs are "different," that
foreign affairs are peculiarly the province of the federal government, that all cases
involving foreign nationals or foreign sovereigns implicate "foreign affairs," and that as
part of its role as a sovereign in the international community the United States has an
obligation to ensure that its human rights practices are on the cutting edge of
enlightened international opinion-which may or may not be sound, but which are
surely neither constitutionally compelled nor historically grounded.
17. This argument was anticipated in Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and InternationalHuman Rights,
83 Am J Intl L 851 (1989). Notice an ironic sidelight of this argument: The disengagement of
constitutional foreign relations jurisprudence from its domestic counterpart proceeded on the
assumption that external and internal affairs were different; now, as a result of corollaries drawn
from that assumption, it is claimed that power in the federal courts to declare that the rules of
international conventions and those of American federal courts shall be the same. In the human
rights area, international declarations become incorporated into the federal law as declared by
American federal courts, notwithstanding specific efforts on the part of the political branches to
resist that incorporation.
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II
Is this tendency to produce purposive, externally driven, constitutional history
peculiar to the field of foreign relations law? I began this essay suggesting that the
tendency of constitutional law to reflect shifting social and political attitudes raises a
problem for the shelf-life of constitutional scholarship that may not exist to the same
degree in other fields. Constitutional law does not seem to have a "core" subject
matter; instead, its core is changing interpretations of the provisions of the
Constitution's text. The easiest generalization to advance about constitutional law is
that interpretations of such provisions will inevitably change with time. Thus it seems
peculiarly difficult to write constitutional commentaries with a long shelf-life. They
appear to be fated to address problems whose centrality is evanescent.
Thus one might well expect constitutional foreign relations scholarship, at any
point in time, to be concerned with issues thought to be central because of the regular
pressure exerted on exercises in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution by
external events. That pressure, in fact, was a major stimulus in producing the initial
separation of domestic constitutional jurisprudence from its foreign relations
counterpart, and has been a major stimulus in reinforcing that separation despite its
problematic theoretical and historical status. In fact, a principal argument animating
the separation of foreign relations from domestic constitutional jurisprudence was
that the foreign affairs of the United States were different from its domestic affairs:
different in kind, involving the acts of a sovereign nation in the international
community, and different in degree, requiring a much more flexible and swift decisionmaking apparatus than the tripartite, federalist republican governmental structure
designed by the Constitution for domestic policymaking.
So it should be no surprise that of all the areas of constitutional jurisprudence,
that of foreign relations should be the most affected by the changing external context
of constitutional law decisions. Nor is it surprising that scholarship in the area should
exhibit a recurrent interest in tailoring constitutional principles to the perceived
demands of contemporary American diplomacy. But this also suggests that
scholarship in the realm of constitutional foreign relations law is peculiarly susceptible
to the problem of obsolescence.
The question is not then, at the end, whether many of those currently engaged in
constitutional foreign relations scholarship are incapable of writing good history.
Rather, the question is whether they are doing themselves a service by assuming that
in their particular arena, history and interpretive fidelity can be ignored in the service
of contemporary normative agendas. The twentieth-century evolution of
constitutional foreign relations scholarship suggests such a ploy worked once before.
But as the lines between domestic and international law blur, those inclined to extend
the logic of foreign affairs exceptionalism too far might find themselves in the position
of fighting skirmishes on the frontier, only to see the center collapsing. Those
concerned with globalizing federal law should consider that once one examines the
assumed distinction between foreign relations and domestic constitutional
jurisprudence, it has the awkward quality of being created out of whole cloth.
Spring 2000
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The preoccupation of twentieth-century constitutional foreign affairs scholars
with the external consequences of foreign relations policymaking made constitutional
foreign affairs law particularly vulnerable to revisionist analysis. The straightforward
strategies of going back to history, and to the structure of powers in the original
constitutional design, exposed the highly purposive quality of the two major
transformations in twentieth-century constitutional foreign relations jurisprudence.
But it would seem that, given tendencies in the field, the revisionists themselves
should worry about excessive purposivism. If the domestic and foreign affairs realms
of American constitutional jurisprudence are to be integrated, there is something to be
said for integrating them on a sound theoretical and historical basis. Historical
methodology can set us free, as Holmes once said, by furnishing us with some distance
from contemporary obsessions. But, properly utilized, it should also constrain us.
Sometimes, the design and meaning of the Constitution create awkward barriers to
the pragmatic "solution" of contemporary legal issues. We need to recognize what is
lost, as well as what might be gained, in ingenious avoidance of those barriers. "'
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